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EXAMINING THEORIES OF GROWTH & DEVELOPMENT & POLICY 








Poverty and inequality around the world has been rising over the last three decades and the 
attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) seems a far fetched goal. In 
explaining underdevelopment, Classical Economics has offered many theories and models 
including but not limited to Rostow’s Stages of Growth Theory, Harrod-Domar Model, Solow’s 
Growth Model, Dependency Theory, Lewis Two Sector Model, Neo-colonial Dependence Model, 
False-Paradigm Model, and Dualistic-Development Thesis etc. This study analyzes the theories 
of development proposed in classical literature in the light of Islamic Economics and 
investigates whether policy response influenced by some of these theories had been effective or 
not in selected countries and regions. In light of recent developments in growth literature, the 
last section of the paper also analyzes whether Islamic economics principles have the capacity to 
ensure that determinants of growth suggested by ‘new growth theory’ will exist in an Islamic 
economy and together with these, do Islamic economic principles have other distinctive 
mechanisms and institutions that can help in the development process.      
 
Keywords: Interest free economy, Public finance, Taxation, Inequality, Income redistribution, 
Islamic economic system, fiscal policy, deficit financing. 
 
JEL-Codes: L38, I31, O10 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The major problems in economic development of any country include poverty, inequality and 
unemployment. All other problems are more or less a result, or a symptom of these three 
problems. Problems like violence and political turmoil that on the surface seem unrelated to 
economics are also caused by poverty, inequality and unemployment. 
 
When one looks at recent development statistics, a very dismal picture appears. In 2001, there 
were 1.1 billion people living in poverty. But in Africa, the number of people in extreme poverty 
rose to 313 million. As people living in extreme poverty increased in number in Africa, they also 
became poorer. The average daily income or consumption of those living on less than $1 a day 
declined from 64 cents in 1981 to 60 cents in 2001. In the rest of the developing regions, it 
inclined from 72 cents to 83 cents. In Africa, the median share of income going to the poorest 20 
percent of the population is 4.9 percent, almost 2 percent points less than in other developing 
regions. Only in Latin America and the Caribbean, do the poorest 20 percent fare worse. (Source: 
UN Development Research Group). Therefore, the question is that how the broad based 
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development would be achieved let alone reducing fiscal deficits as faced by most developing 
countries at the moment.    
 
In mainstream development economics literature, several theories and models have been 
proposed in explaining the multidimensional problem of poverty and underdevelopment. These 
include Rostow‘s Stages of Growth Theory, Harrod-Domar Model, Solow‘s Growth Model, 
Dependency Theory, Lewis Two Sector Model, Neo-colonial Dependence Model, False-
Paradigm Model, and Dualistic-Development Thesis etc.  
 
In this backdrop, this study analyzes the theories of development proposed in classical literature 
in the light of Islamic Economics and also analyzes the policy response based on these theories 
and its impact on selected countries.   
         
2. Brief Analysis of Classical Development Theories 
 
The assumptions and supposed stages in Rostow‘s Growth Theory are highly simplistic and 
evidence is against the suggested linear progression to each higher stage. Definition of a 
traditional society in Rostow‘s Growth Theory is incongruent with Islamic principles, especially 
when it comes to the role of religion in a society. In an Islamic society, religion is the core, 
whereas, Rostow‘s Growth Theory assumes religion to be a source of primitiveness just like 
Marx who opined that religion is opium. 
 
Structural transformation, which is considered as a pre-requisite in that theory for the take off 
stage had been proved to be flawed in many countries whenever it was forced upon by developed 
countries extraneously with no regard to peculiarities in individual regions.  
 
In Harrod-Domar and Solow‘s Growth model, the emphasis is on increasing savings and 
investments and that is supposed to lead to increased productivity corresponding to lower ICOR 
in Harrod-Domar model and hence higher rate of growth and to higher steady state level of 
output in Solow‘s Growth model. But, the savings are much less dependent on real interest rates 
in LDCs as the empirical evidence shows. Savings feature despite the negative real interest rates.  
 
Plus, in all Structural Adjustment Programmes, IMF and WB insisted on increasing indirect 
taxes and freeing trade barriers which increased imports, resulted in depreciation of currencies 
and together with indirect taxes, fueled inflation. Hence, real interest rates in almost all of the 
developing regions have been negative for quite some time.  
 
Kuznets‘s inverted U-hypothesis also seems to be missing support from empirical data. 
Inequality in USA, China and India increased even after the economies experienced continuous 
rise in per capita incomes. In fact, the empirical data supports the view that inequality is the 
cornerstone of economies following maxims of neoclassical counter-revolution. The result is best 
described by Stieglitz who calls this kind of economics, the ‘trickle up’ economics than ‘trickle 
down economics’.   
 
Neo-colonial Dependence Model, False-Paradigm Model, and Dualistic-Development Thesis are 
all effective political economy explanations of underdevelopment, especially of South Asian, 
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African, Latin American & Middle East countries.  
 
In the next section, we take a brief look at some of policies which were tried taking inspiration 
from some of these theories and we try to see the impact of these policies in dealing with 
underdevelopment.    
 
3. Development Programmes & their Impact  
 
3.1. Case of Pakistan 
 
After its independence, Pakistan followed the policy of import substitution. Haq (1963) gave the 
concept of functional inequality in 1960s. Based on his praise for Harrod-Domar and Solow 
growth models, he reasoned:  
 
―The road to eventual equalities may inevitably lie through initial inequalities.‖ 
 
In 1960s, Pakistan witnessed high growth rate, was able to create an industrial class, but later, it 
was found that this growth only benefitted a very specific small class and created huge income 
inequality and disparity which eventually led to the separation of East Pakistan from West 
Pakistan. 
 
Haq (1995) later on accepted that humans are ‗means‘ as well as ‗ends‘ of any development 
process or initiative. He finally accepted that ‗Ends‘ cannot be sacrificed for the future, even 
when benefits are certain, and ignoring ‗ends‘ undermines the entire development process. 
 
In the later part of 1980s, Pakistan went to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
(WB) for Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). IMF and WB recommended privatization, 
diminished role of government in running businesses, deregulation, liberalization, removal of 
quotas on international trade, lowering tariffs, expanding list of importable items, removing 
subsidies, increasing indirect taxes and let the currency be floated freely.   
 
Zaidi (2005, p.328) on analyzing the effects of IMF policies and Structural Adjustment Program 
pursued in Pakistan, reasoned in following words:   
 
―Such programmes have very serious negative impacts on growth, inflation, income distribution, 
the social sectors, and poverty. In general, Structural Adjustment Programmes have made 
matters far worse for countries that have followed them. We have examined the philosophy that 
governs such adjustment programmes, which is essentially one of liberalization, openness, and 
greater integration with the new economic world order, and we have found that not just the 
adjustment programmes themselves, but also the thinking behind them does not take account of 
specific factors and the context of specific countries.―     
 
Anwar (1996) analyzing the SAP in Pakistan and its effect on poverty argued through an 
empirical research that not only the absolute poverty incidence, but also the intensity and 
severity of poverty increased significantly by all poverty lines and poverty measures over the 
period of adjustment. He further noted that SAP created new poor in urban areas amongst the 
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low income groups (mainly clerical and sales workers) whose real wages were eroded over the 
period. Poverty also increased unambiguously among self-employed and unemployed who seems 
to have been affected adversely by the overall economic contraction.  
 
Even now, capitalistic democracy in Pakistan is keeping the market in a status quo for the benefit 
of big monopolists who in collaboration with politicians further their interests and bring barriers 
to entry for new entrants. ‗Functional inequality‘ episode strengthened the elitist class and people 
of higher financial standing and political influence of this class can get loans and default on 
them, can bypass red tapism and avoid taxes.  
 
The country‘s banks and other financial institutions wrote off over Rs 30 billion during the 
governments of Muhammad Khan Junejo, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif on political 
basis. (Source: The News, March 13, 2000). 
 
Only 2.75 million Pakistanis, or 1.6% of the country's estimated 170 million people, are 
registered tax-payers, but the Structural Adjustment Programs only emphasized on removing 
subsidies, raising utility prices and increasing indirect taxes. The policy to lower and 
subsequently remove import tariffs badly affected the domestic industrial base. Now, 
government regularly has to trim PSDP (Public Sector Development Program) to finance fiscal 
deficit. Elitist class has not yet allowed passing of tax on agriculture, real estate and wealth. 
Crony capitalism led to selling strategic and important public sector corporations at through 
away prices as part of Structural Adjustment Program. 
 
Currently, Pakistan pays around Rs 1,000 billion in debt servicing. Most of the debt is of the 
nature of deadweight debt. About half of the tax revenue goes to the lenders in paying of interest. 
  
Politicians in this capitalistic democracy too contribute in maintaining the status quo by 
providing token benefits to their voters (even without providing in many cases) and by creating 
an environment where the poor have no choice than to join hands and support them to safeguard 
their private property rights in absence of ruling class fulfilling its basic responsibility of 
safeguarding private property rights. 
 
Rodrik (2006) explained that when investment is constrained by poor property rights, improving 
financial intermediation will not help. Security of property rights has been one of the most 
important determinants of why some countries developed quickly than others. (Acemoglu et al, 
2001).  
 
3.2. Case of Africa 
 
Just to put the issue in right perspective, consider these facts. Africa‘s debt stock in 1970 was 
$11 billion and Africa‘s debt stock in 2008 stood at $215 billion. Furthermore, Sub Saharan 
Africa receives $10 billion in aid but loses $14 billion in debt payments per year (Africa Action, 
2008). 
 
Currently, Africa‘s total external debt stands at $300 billion. Many African countries spend more 
on debt than either on health or education. For example, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, 
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Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia all spent more on debt than on 
health in 2002. GNP per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa is $308 while external debt per capita 
stands at $365. Just to cite one example, Nigeria borrowed around $5 billion and has paid about 
$16 billion, but still owes $28 billion. Regrettably, 7 million children die each year as a result of 
the debt crisis.  
 
To cite another example, Zambia was unable to employ 9,000 qualified teachers because of a 
public sector wage freeze imposed by the IMF in 2004 as a condition of receiving HIPC (Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries) debt relief. Half of African population in Africa doesn‘t have a meal a 
day. 
 
Habisso (2009) analyzing the impact of aid on development in Africa commented: 
 
―The continuing failure of official international aid to encourage the emergence of a self-
sustaining growth in agricultural and industrial sectors, geared to local needs, has led many to 
question the appropriateness of aid per se. A number of problems with the current system of aid 
assistance have been identified: (i) Since some of the aid is in the form of loans rather than direct 
grants, poorer countries may find themselves getting into increasing debt; (ii) A considerable 
proportion of any aid package is swallowed up in payments to technical experts, the field-staff of 
the donor countries, or on the costly housing, transport, and diet arrangements made for them in 
the host country.‖ 
 
Habisso (2009) further notes that aid often increases dependency by being loaned to a country on 
condition that it must be used to purchase goods from the donor country, i.e. aid tying. Almost 
70% of British aid is loaned on these terms, which means in effect the main beneficiaries of aid 
are the capitalists in the developed world. 
 
McCord et al. (2005) discussing the effect of SAP on the development of Africa revealed that 
Africa was the only major developing country region with negative per capita growth during 
1980 to 2000; its health conditions are by far the worst on the planet; its soaring population is 
exacerbating ecological stresses; and despite the policy-based development lending of structural 
adjustment, it remains mired in poverty and debt. 
 
3.4. Case of China 
 
China made progress because it could not be lured into taking excessive debt. Most of the growth 
owed to localized and indigenous efforts and an active role played by public sector with 
discretionary intervention when and where necessary. The sustainability of the growth 
momentum also owed to the fact that China did not allow fiscal bleeding unlike the mantra 
favored by IMF and WB for developing countries to take on debt and develop infrastructure with 
it. Indigenous and uncompromising leadership made the growth possible and to keep it 
sustaining.   
 
Rodrik (2010) explained that there has not been a greater instance of poverty reduction in history 
than that of China in the quarter century since the late 1970s. Interestingly, he points out that 
western economists or their piece of research did not play an instrumental role in China‘s 
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reforms. He mentioned that South Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam all achieved success in 
development with their own set of reforms and policies. He argued that in none of these Asian 
cases did economic research, at least as conventionally understood, play a significant role in 
shaping development policy. The same is true of other long-term successes elsewhere, such as 
Botswana and Mauritius. 
 
Chang (2006) explaining the role of institutions and governments to steer development efforts 
successfully cited that countries like France, Austria, Finland, Norway, and Taiwan have 
extensively used state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in steering their impressive economic 
developments after the WWII. Citing an example of Korea, he argued that the famous Korean 
steel producer, POSCO, was set up in the early 1970s as an SOE in a country that did not even 
produce the raw materials (iron ore or coking coal) at a time when such act was a clear defiance 
of comparative advantage, but it went on to become the most cost-efficient steel producer in the 
world within a decade of its establishment. 
 
3.5. Case of Ecuador 
 
Working over there, Perkins (2004) revealed that for every $100 of crude oil taken out of the 
Ecuadorian rain forests, the foreign oil companies receive $75. Of the remaining $25, three-
quarters must go to paying off the foreign debt. Most of the remainder covers military and other 
government expenses which leaves about $2.50 for health, education, and programs aimed at 
helping the poor. Hence, out of every $100 worth of oil pinched from the Amazon, less than $3 
goes to the people who need the money most. With resources taken away from debt servicing, 
human capital, which is cited as engine of growth and development cannot possibly be given due 
importance.  
 
3.6. Case of Transition Countries 
 
Zawalinska (2004) noted that the most painful effect of SAPs in Transition countries was a high 
and persistent unemployment resulting from restructuring and privatization processes. Many 
countries experienced a jump in unemployment from the level close to zero to about 20% over 
first 5 years. 
 
He further noted that the most immediate influence of SAPs on households was a burst of 
inflation which occurred as a result of prompt liberalization. This unquestionably heavily hit all 
the households as their private savings immediately lost value and only higher income 
households could shift the rest of their savings from the bank to fixed assets. The poor 
households had to face the substantial decrease in value of their purchasing power without much 
security. 
 
4. Critical Analysis of Free Trade & Comparative Advantage Principle 
 
In this section, we will analyze that has the lacking on implementation front or inadequate 
institutional framework contributed to underdevelopment and shortcomings in development 
progress. We will present analysis of why this argument is weak and mention several possible 
reasons responsible for the underdevelopment which have nothing to do with poor governance 
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and institutions. While poor governance and inadequate institutional framework may have 
worsened matters, they are not the only factors behind shortcomings in development progress. 
The policies themselves and the lack of commitment on other ancillary fronts by developed 
countries have also resulted in underdevelopment of the developing countries.     
 
Coming out of a debt and poverty trap requires consistent growth for a sustainable period. But, 
international trade restrictions take much of the ability to grow from developing countries. 
Tariffs charged by high-income countries on goods important to developing countries, such as 
textiles and agricultural products, remain high. Subsidies of $350 billion a year to agricultural 
producers in Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD) countries are 
another barrier to developing country exports. Global trade is not yet a level playing field. 
 
Other than tariffs, high-income countries accuse developing countries of not following 
environmental standards, Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT), Sanitary & Phyto-Sanitary Barriers 
to Trade (SBT), Kyoto Protocol etc and thereby further reduce the ability and capacity of 
developing countries to gain from exchange and get out of debt and poverty trap. High-income 
countries account for half the world‘s Carbon Di-Oxide (Co2) emissions (Source: Carbon 
Dioxyde Information Analysis Center data). Furthermore, High-income countries account for 
36% of emissions of organic water pollution (Source: World Bank). 
 
Due to this, most developing countries are going through a perpetual debt trap which takes away 
resources that could have been used on development, but instead are used to service compounded 
debt. Interest payments take up most of the resources of the government. It must be kept in mind 
that principal amount of debt remains same even if debt is serviced each year. Even if only debt 
is serviced each year, the debt servicing amount would continue to increase each year with 
compounding effect. 
 
Total external debt of low-income countries stands at $523 billion. Total debt service being paid 
every day by low-income countries amounts to $100 million. For every $1 received in aid, low 
income countries pay at least $2.30 in debt service.  
 
Theory of Comparative Advantage states that resources should be allocated to the efficient 
sectors of the economy. If U.S.A has a comparative advantage in producing cars and if Pakistan 
has a comparative advantage in producing wheat; then, Pakistan should allocate its resources on 
producing wheat and U.S.A should allocate its resources to produce cars. Both Pakistan and 
U.S.A can gain from exchange and specialization. 
 
But this will only work when the trade is fair and when both countries do actually allocate their 
resources to their efficient sectors. Instead what happens is that developed countries have 
absolute advantage in producing most goods over developing countries. Developed countries 
allocate their resources in producing goods that they can produce most efficiently and use the 
proceeds from sale to provide subsidies to their inefficient sectors and virtually paralyze the 
developing economies by depriving them of their chance of gaining through exchange and 
specialization.  
 
The export subsidies provided by developed countries to their inefficient sectors enable the 
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inefficient sector to become efficient artificially and crowd out the developing countries by 
overproducing and then dumping these goods in the third world countries. If the supply exceeds 
demand, developed countries have not been reluctant to dump their production in sea if they 
can‘t do it in the developing countries! It is just to fulfill ‗get the prices right‘ mantra espoused 
from Washington Consensus.  
 
By providing export subsidies to their inefficient sectors, developed countries create distortions 
in trade and misappropriations in resource allocation. The export subsidies paid by the developed 
countries to their inefficient agriculture sector are funded through the proceeds of exports. 
Hence, these are in reality cross subsidies. Therefore, effectively these subsidies are paid by the 
developing countries. Developed countries charge huge premium for value addition that is not in 
line with their out-of-pocket costs. The difference is especially huge in information technology 
products, software and pharmaceuticals. Once software or medicine is made, the capacity is 
virtually unlimited. Unlimited copies can be sold provided there is enough demand. Cost per unit 
is spread over larger output. At higher levels of output, marginal cost is negligible and constant 
in these products.  
 
Therefore, developing countries are denied gains from comparative advantage in agriculture 
through export subsidies provided by developed countries to their comparatively inefficient 
agriculture sector. Subsidies of $350 billion a year to agricultural producers in OECD countries 
are a barrier to developing country exports (Source: World Development Indicators 2005). This 
creates unemployment and poverty in the developing economy. Agriculture is still the most 
important sector in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) in terms of achieving growth, and 
sourcing funds for development and redistribution efforts as the evidence from Table 1 shows.   
 
Table 1: Share of Agriculture (%) in GDP and Employment in LDCs  
 
Agriculture Share in Less Developed Countries 
 1980 1990 2000 2006 
In Employment (%) 79.5 76 70.8 68.6 
In GDP (%) 30 29.5 30.2 28 
Source: World Development Indicators 2008, World Bank  
 
Brown (2002), former head of the United Nations Development Program, estimated that farm 
subsidies cost poor countries about $50 billion a year in lost agricultural exports. He concluded 
that this amount is the equivalent of today's level of development assistance. 
 
Eventually, a developing country will have to submit itself before the international financial 
institutions that are able to exert extraordinary influence -not limited to economic but also 
political- in the developing country. Therefore, the role of IMF, WB, World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the adaptation of SAP and Free-Float exchange rate systems are all interrelated in 
their objectives to maintain the status quo of supremacy of developed world over developing 
countries. Mercantilism stands completely opposite to Free trade theory, but, the former was 
supported when Europe needed it. 
 
Higher tariffs are levied by developed countries on products involving a higher degree of value 
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addition. In the European Union (EU), processed foods are subjected to a higher tariff than 
unprocessed foods, and fabrics to a higher tariff than thread. In addition to that, many finished 
textile goods were not allowed under quantitative restrictions, which is a clear violation of WTO. 
Even if they can produce processed products more cheaply than the developed countries, tariffs 
tilted the balance against them. 
 
Through ‗Tariff escalation‘, developing countries are discouraged to enhance their industrial 
base and capacity and move from their traditional colonial trading pattern of exporting raw 
materials and simple manufactures to be exporting value added goods. 
 
To summarize, in this section, we analyzed that lacking on implementation front or inadequate 
institutional framework is not chiefly responsible for the underdevelopment. The policies 
themselves and the lack of commitment on other ancillary fronts by developed countries with 
regards to biasness in international trade, tariff escalation, biased and inconsistent resort to 
environmental excuses etc have also resulted in underdevelopment of LDCs.     
 
5. Flawed Theories & Prescriptions Lead to Undesirable Outcomes 
 
The term ―Washington Consensus‖ refers to development strategies centered on privatization, 
liberalization, and deregulation and built upon a strong belief in free markets and aimed at 
reducing the role of government. These policies were prescribed for developing countries 
through various programs including Structural Adjustment Programmes. 
 
Below, we review literature which critically analyzes the prescriptions put forward under 
―Washington Consensus‖.  
 
Stieglitz (2004, p. 1) commenting on Washington consensus remarked:  
 
―If there is a consensus today about what strategies are most likely to promote the development 
of the poorest countries in the world, it is this: there is no consensus except that the Washington 
consensus did not provide the answer. Its recipes were neither necessary nor sufficient for 
successful growth.‖  
 
Woo (2004) reasoned that the Washington Consensus runs the danger of denying the state its 
rightful role in providing an important range of public goods.  
 
Stieglitz (2004) contrasting the development experience of East Asia with Washington consensus 
wrote that Washington Consensus inspired development strategy stands in marked contrast to the 
successful strategies pursued in East Asia, where the development state took an active role. He 
reasoned that there is no theoretical underpinning to believe that in early stages of development, 
markets by themselves will lead to efficient outcomes.  
 
Commenting on trickledown economics, Stiglitz (2004) noted that the notion that somehow 
everybody would benefit is flawed as the evidence against trickledown economics is now 
overwhelming.  
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In late 1999, to enhance the contribution of their interventions to international poverty reduction 
efforts, IMF and the WB adopted a new strategy for their assistance to low-income countries. 
The main features of this strategy were (a) both institutions were to base their concessional 
lending and debt relief to low-income countries on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
prepared by the countries themselves; and (b) IMF concessional lending was to be provided 
through a revised lending facility, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)—with a 
stronger poverty reduction focus. 
 
In PRSPs, broad based participation is a well orchestrated desire, but, how this could be made 
possible with so much direct and indirect political interference of Donor countries and 
International DFIs in the developing countries is a big concern.  
 
Levinsohn (2002) noted that the suggestion that more open trade is good for the poor is based 
more on faith than evidence. Although the PRSP documents are peppered with references to 
molding the particulars of a poverty alleviation program to the details of the country, the 
discussion of trade policy (as well as some of the macroeconomic prescriptions) seems to come 
from a one-size-fits-all mentality. 
 
Rodrik (2006) contrasting the perceptual differences regarding security of property rights argued 
that presumably, investors felt more secure when they were allied with local governments with 
residual claims on the stream of profits in China than when they had to entrust their assets to 
private contracts that would have to be enforced by incompetent and corrupt courts in Russia. 
Whatever the underlying reason, China‘s experience demonstrates how common goals 
(protection of property rights) can sometimes be achieved under divergent rules.  
 
To summarize, we can say that the uniformity of problems does not necessitate the use of same 
remedies as the dynamics of each region and their peculiar context is different. 
 
6. Need for a Paradigm Shift in Development Focus 
 
Such unanimity in shortcomings in underdevelopment in varied regions and after so many 
policies have been tried for so long, hints us towards understanding that merely the lacking in 
implementation could not have led to such a happening. Governance in less developed countries 
has been no less poor or better than developed countries. Hence, the inclusive approach 
envisaged in PRSPs put forward by WB seems a reasonable way to approach development after 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are increasingly appearing to be underachieved in 
entirety.      
 
Rodrik (2010) argued that successful countries achieving development identify sequentially the 
most binding constraints and remove them with locally suited remedies. He favored diagnostics 
which require pragmatism and eclecticism, in the use of both theory and evidence. 
 
Fundamentally, there is also a need to revisit the indicators and barometers of progress and 
development. Stieglitz has also been very critical of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a sole 
measure of growth. GDP per Capita cited as a measure of economic development is also not 
devoid of problems as it is based on GDP and cannot take into account distribution of income, 
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resources or wealth. 
 
 
7. Normative Divide Between Islamic & Capitalistic Development Philosophies 
 
Resources are scarce as compared to unlimited wants. But, the economics of non-rival ideas 
creation has proved that resources are ample and that physical resources could be used in ways 
that keeps fulfilling the basic needs of society through the creation of ideas that augment and 
bring multiplier effect to the availability of given physical resources. 
 
In simple words, the development in science and technology by developing human capital base 
has enabled the societies through each level in history to make best use of physical resources and 
avoid resource exhaustion for the basic requirements. 
 
Despite that, problems like poverty have persisted and even got severe in some regions in last 
century than in the past. Problem is not with resource scarcity, it is with distribution of resources 
which require an equitable and egalitarian socio-economic system. What is needed is a system 
that consists of institutions working towards fulfilling this objective. 
 
Capitalism, the way it is practiced as an economic system, has largely allowed and promoted 
certain institutions and their operations based on free market philosophy and such institutions 
have been chief reasons behind much of distributional inequity in the world today, both in 
developed as well as in developing regions. 
 
Interest based financial intermediation in theory and in practice has exhibited increased 
concentration of wealth in the world. A system is not an end in itself; rather it is meant to serve 
the needs of society at large amicably. 
 
Indeed, when we glance over statistics of poverty on one hand and rising inequality on the other, 
we ought to question the merits of such institutions. Indeed, even in free market philosophy, we 
do not allow certain institutions which bring harm to the society and individual liberty. But, yet, 
so far, we have turned limited attention towards critically evaluating the intricate system of 
interest based financial intermediation. 
 
Islamic economic system is a blend of natural features present in Capitalism i.e. right to private 
property, private pursuit of economic interest, use of market forces etc used along with some 
distinct features derived through Islamic economic teachings i.e. interest free economy, moral 
check on unbridled self-pursuit and provision of socio-economic justice to achieve the goals of 
Socialism as far as is naturally possible without denying individual freedom and incentives. 
 
Another aspect of resource scarcity is completely psychological rather than physiological. 
Humans compare themselves relatively to their contemporary peers. Indeed, we, as individuals 
have much more facilities and better standard of living in material terms than even the kings of 
the past. But, even that does not satiate our hunger and sense of deprivation. 
 
Page 12 of 15 
Religion provides such meaningful conditioning which makes us bring the right balance between 
our aspirations and physical limits. Religion also promises salvage from the limitedness of this 
worldly life in heaven which will be awarded to the most righteous people. This, in turn, 
provides a permanent incentive to choose righteous behavior as an end with the hope and fear of 
deterministic results in life hereafter. 
 
Schematically, we present the two models below: 
 
Capitalism Microeconomic Model 
 
Scarce Resources 
Pursuing private benefit Unlimited Wants 
  Indifferent between right & wrong   
 
Islamic Microeconomic Model 
  
Scarce Resources Seeking Allah's pleasure Unlimited Wants 
  Differentiate between right and wrong   
 
8. Development from Islamic Perspective    
 
In neoclassical growth theories, the emphasis is on increasing savings and technological progress 
which brings about increase in capital per worker and eventually output per worker and enables 
an economy to reach the steady state level of output. In ‗endogenous growth theory‘ models, 
more sophisticated work has been done by endogenizing the technology, human capital and 
savings.  
 
To summarize their findings, these theories and models help explain the differences in per capita 
across countries and conclude that countries with high savings and investment rate, having 
people spending more time in learning new skills and with better social infrastructure in the form 
of strong private property rights are able to have more per capita income than countries which 
lack in these characteristics.       
 
Below, we try to analyze whether Islamic economic principles have the capacity to help build 
these elements for sustainable growth and development.      
 
8.1. Boosting Investment in Islamic Economy   
 
With a lenient rate of Income Zakat, the productive sector is provided with incentive to ensure 
achieving potential output with lenient fiscal levies and no scarcity of capital through prohibition 
of interest. This could itself bring about increase in output per person in economy and could 
bring stability in prices. Tax on cash and capital will force the people to invest their money in 
productive uses. With prohibition of interest, this money will only go in business either with the 
start of one's own business or equity participation in Mudarabah and stocks etc. 
 
Besides this, a consistent and credible low tax rate policy with broader Zakat base ensures 
minimum distortions, boosts aggregate demand and encourages investment by decreasing costs 
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of doing business and this could also simultaneously solve microeconomic problems of 
imperfection in markets by increasing competition and helping to reduce market power. 
 
8.2. Improving Income Distribution in Islamic Economy    
 
If we study the classical and neo-classical literature on growth and development, the theories and 
policies based on them have felt short to improve income distribution.    
 
Islam economics has many non-state mechanisms to ensure income redistribution without 
interfering with individual freedom and market mechanism; we discuss three main mechanisms 
below: 
    
8.2.1. Prohibition of Interest – Interest as a system of allocation of resources ensures a fixed 
return for one and variable and uncertain for another. In contrast, Islam encourages equity 
financing in which the loss/profit would be shared. This ensures better results from the 
perspective of redistribution and better co-operative behavior since payoffs for all parties 
are linked with productive sector of the economy. Consequently, markets will not have to 
produce speculative surplus output just to service exorbitant amount of debt and that 
could stabilize business cycles. 
 
8.2.2. Family System & Inheritance Distribution – Family system of Islam brings social 
capital into existence. It ensures empathy and responsibility. It brings a very lasting and 
durable social safety net. Islamic injunctions about how to treat orphans and polygamy in 
special circumstances ensure social security for individuals with special circumstances. 
Furthermore, the inheritance laws ensure that the wealth of the deceased is distributed 
widely among the members of the family of the deceased and this permanently and 
systematically ensures doing away with the concentration of wealth in every generation.          
 
8.2.3. Zakat & Infaaq – Zakat is a combination of wealth and income levy. It includes all 
heads of income and forms of wealth excluding only the means of production, items of 
personal use and value below Nisab. With a Wealth Zakat, redistribution objective is 
directly achieved. It reduces confinement of wealth in few hands. The flow (income) and 
the stock (wealth) both are taxed and hence it ensures appropriate transfer of wealth and 
transfer of asset ownership to the needy. If an economy is in disequilibrium and policies 
fail to immediately recover and boost incomes, wealth Zakat enables the distributive 
allocation that works independently of business cycles and help stabilize the extremes of 
business cycles.    
  
8.3. Building Social Infrastructure in Islamic Economy 
  
Islam does not disallow private property rights. On the other hand, Islam also educates people 
that they are not just responsible to fulfill duties set out in a legal framework in a society‘s 
legislature, but are also responsible to Allah. There are several such recommendations in Quran 
which are not binding in the legal sense of the word, but which educate the people of the desired 
behavior expected by their Creator.   
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Second, private property rights are safeguarded by the state after the provision of taxes. Beyond 
Zakah, Islam also does not give the government the right to fetch people‘s money and violate 
private property rights.  
 
Third, rather than keeping other things as it is, Islam has a very clear view on certain institutions 
like ‗interest based lending‘ which has been chiefly responsible for concentration of wealth, 
rising inequality and even poverty and is an exploitative form of earning money. Islam by 
disallowing interest based earnings, exploitative forms of trade and imposition of excessive taxes 
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